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Abstract:  The Asia Pacific region  was  characterized in  the second half of the twentieth 
century by an absence of regional trading arrangements.  The situations changed after 2000, 
raising questions of sequencing and of the boundaries of the region.  This paper argues that 
the proliferation of regional and bilateral agreements has been driven by the rapid emergence 
of  regional  value  chains  and  centres  on  trade  facilitation  measures.    These  create  deep 
regionalism  and  variable  boundaries,  depending  upon  which  countries  integrate  into  the 
regional value chains. 
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REGIONALISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:  
HOW WIDE, HOW DEEP? 
 
Until 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, regionalism was 
conspicuously absent from East Asia.  During the GATT era it was common to contrast the 
situation in East Asia with the waves of regional trading arrangements (RTAs) occurring in 
Europe,  the  Americas  and  Africa.    Korea  and  Japan  were  the  only  countries  among  the 
charter members of the WTO not party to any RTAs.  China was busy negotiating accession 
to the WTO and pursued a multilateral trade policy.
1  The only RTA in East Asia was the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and by common consent ASEAN had had 
little impact on trade flows since its inception in 1967. 
In sharp contrast, the twenty-first century has seen East Asia in the vanguard of a new 
wave  of  regional  and  bilateral  trade  agreements.  What  explains  this  sharp  change  of 
direction?  If East Asian regionalism is thriving, this raises two further questions:  how wide 
is the region that it covers and what is the content of, or how deep is, the regional integration? 
This paper argues that regionalism in East Asia is now a substantial phenomenon.  
Regionalism  did  not  flourish  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century  because  Asian 
countries pursued inward-oriented development strategies or, when they pursued outward-
oriented strategies, their trade was overwhelmingly with countries outside the region.  Intra-
Asian preferential  trading arrangements  held  no attraction and when countries  liberalized 
trade policies it was on a non-discriminatory basis (Section 1).  Several catalysts encouraged 
monetary  integration  after  1997  and  talk  of  an  Asian  sequence  of  monetary  integration 
preceding trade integration, but actual steps in the monetary sphere have been small (Section 
2a).  In contrast, since 2000 there has been an explosion of bilateral and plurilateral trade 
agreements,  targeting  non-tariff  or  regulatory  impediments  to  trade  The  proliferation  of 
agreements  has  raised  concerns  about  how  to  simplify  the  noodle  bowl  and  consolidate 
regional arrangements, which in turn raises questions about which countries to include in 
consolidated Asian regional arrangements (Section 2b).  The driving force behind East Asian 
regionalism is identified in Section 3 as the rapid growth of intra-regional trade centred on 
regional value chains.  In a region of low most-favoured nation tariffs, the functioning of 
regional  value  chains  can  be  facilitated  by  bilateral  or  plurilateral  agreements.    The 
concluding section argues that East Asian regionalism will continue to deepen because trade 
facilitation  addresses  “beyond  trade”  issues  of  harmonization,  mutual  recognition  of 
                                                           
1 Mongolia, which joined the WTO in 1997, and Taiwan also had non-discriminatory trade policies. 2 
 
regulations and so forth, and its width will be related to the geographical reach of the regional 
value chains. 
 
1.  Regionalism in East Asia 1950-2000 
 
During the 1960s many observers saw the global trading system caught in a headlong rush to 
regionalism.
2  Following  the  example  of  Western  Europe,  an  alphabet  soup  of  regional 
trading arrangements was created in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa.  These non-
European RTAs had little economic impact and the wave ebbed.  In the 1980s and early 
1990s  a  second  wave  of  RTAs  included  negotiations  leading  to  formation  of  the  North 
American Free Trade Area and discussion of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, leading 
commentators to fear a collapse of the global system into three blocs centred on Europe, the 
Western Hemisphere and Asia.  In both waves Asia was the missing link, with no serious 
RTA formation or creation of a regional bloc. 
The only significant regional arrangement in East Asia was ASEAN, whose political 
origins lay in links between the anti-Communist regimes of the region and in confidence-
building between Malaysia and Indonesia (Severino, 2009).  Attempts in the 1970s to provide 
an  economic  impetus  to  ASEAN  through  coordination  of  industrial  projects  or  other 
measures grounded in import-substituting industrialization had minimal impact.  Members 
wanted to support their own import competing industries, but were unwilling to support their 
partners‟ uncompetitive industries.  As the five original ASEAN members shifted towards 
more outward-oriented economic development strategies in the 1980s, their exports went to 
markets outside the region and intra-regional trade remained small. 
ASEAN finally moved towards becoming an RTA with the 1992 announcement that 
an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) would be established by 2008.  Even this was a hesitant 
step.  Internal tariffs would be reduced to five percent or less rather than full tariff-free intra-
ASEAN trade, preferential tariff reductions were back-loaded to take effect as late in the 
transition period as possible, and lengthy lists of commodities were excluded.  Moreover the 
paperwork was often sufficient disincentive that traders did not claim the preferential tariff 
rate  even  if  they  were  eligible.    At  the  same  time,  ASEAN  countries  (Philippines  and 
Thailand in particular) unilaterally cut tariffs on a large range of goods, reducing the margin 
                                                           
2 Pomfret (1997) substantiates the generalizations made in this paragraph. 3 
 
of preference (Ando and Kimura, 2005).  The net result was that AFTA‟s preferential tariffs 
had a very small impact on trade in the 1990s (Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2008).  
AFTA was the only RTA in East Asia in the second half of the twentieth century.  
Sub-regional trading zones emerged in the Pearl River Delta (the PRD involved Hong Kong, 
Macau and Guangdong Province of China) and around Singapore (Sijori, or Singapore, Johor 
and  Riau),  but  these  were  market-driven,  with  some  public  policy  measures  to  facilitate 
cross-border trade and investment (Pomfret, 1996).  Other sub-regional zones or “growth 
triangles” tried to replicate the success of the PRD or Sijori, with more state involvement and 
less  economic  impact.    In  Northeast  Asia  the  Tumen  River  Project,  a  state-driven  sub-
regional zone involving the Koreas, China, Japan and Mongolia, had little economic effect. 
Although AFTA had little impact as a conventional RTA with preferential tariffs, 
cooperation  among  ASEAN  members  did  have  economic  effects  during  the  1990s.  
Singapore  already  had  liberal  and  efficient  trade  arrangements,  but  Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines all began to streamline their border facilities.  
Much  of  this  trade  facilitation  could  be  done  unilaterally,  but  there  were  benefits  from 
coordination and standardization between neighbours and on a regional basis.  Coordination 
among customs officials and initiatives such as the ASEAN Single Window were aimed at 
reducing the time and cost of trading across ASEAN borders.  Individual steps can be listed, 
but their impact is hard to measure.  At the aggregate level, however, trade costs of the five 
countries declined substantially, converging on the best practice of Singapore.
3 
In sum, regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region was characterized by its absence.  The 
open  (i.e.  non-preferential)  regionalism  of  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC), 
which was established in 1989, was not regionalism in the normal sense of RTAs and the 
membership encompassed a range of countries with no common features beyond a Pacific 
coastline.
4  Politically, APEC was driven by US opposition to and Australian fear of being 
sidelined by an Asian RTA, such as the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by 
Malaysia.  Open regionalism was popular in the context of many Asian countries seeking to 
liberalize their own trade policies and hoping for reciprocal multilateral liberalization on the 
part of other countries beyond what was being achieved in multilateral trade negotiations (the 
Uruguay Round) which seemed stalled at the end of the 1980s.  The declaration at the 1994 
                                                           
3 Pomfret and Sourdin (2009) provide evidence that trade costs of the ASEAN countries fell substantially during 
the 1990s and significantly faster than other countries‟ trade costs, suggesting that national policies as well as 
technical change were responsible. 
4 APEC now includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the 
USA and Vietnam. 4 
 
Bogor Summit that APEC members would remove their tariffs by 2010, with extensions for 
developing countries to 2020, was the high-point of open regionalism.
5  When the USA tried 
to push trade liberalization further in 1996 with the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation 
(EVSL) initiative, it ran into opposition led by Japan.  APEC members were unwilling to 
accept pressure to liberalize beyond what they would have done unilaterally, and the scope 
for concerted unilateral liberalization had narrowed by the late 1990s.   Although APEC 
remains active in areas such as trade facilitation and APEC summits provide a useful meeting 
place for world leaders, open regionalism lost the significance that it attained in the mid-
1990s.  APEC‟s inability to find any response to the 1997 Asian Crisis underlined its limited 
relevance as a regional institution.   
 
2.  Asian Regionalism in the Twenty-first Century 
 
The 1997/8 Asian Crisis provided a catalyst for change.  Many Asians felt that the global 
institutions provided too little assistance too late, and contrasted the generous support that 
had been given in the recent past to Latin American countries or Russia.  The main culprit 
was the IMF and Japan latched on to this to propose the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund.  
Following the momentum gathering in Western Europe towards the creation of the euro, there 
was even talk of an Asian currency.  However, none of these grand plans attracted serious 
support. 
China was relatively little affected by the Asian Crisis and in 1997 was a staunch 
supporter of the multilateral institutions, willing to follow the US lead in matters of global 
economic architecture.  This support started to flag as China perceived itself receiving little 
credit for its  position and for self-effacing measures  such as not  joining the competitive 
devaluations of 1997-8.  The US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 
was a catalyst for re-evaluation of China‟s position and a decision to shift China‟s support in 
favour of regional institutions. 
In the 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and 
Korea agreed on currency swap arrangements in the case of a balance of payments crisis.  
The CMI was the first East Asian regional agreement in banking and finance; although there 
had  been  informal  arrangements,  such  as  the  Executives'  Meeting  of  East  Asia-Pacific 
                                                           
5 APEC may have also had a less direct impact on trade by encouraging transparency, which Helble, Shepherd 
and Wilson (2009) found to significantly increased trade flows. 5 
 
Central Banks (EMEAP), none had the formal status or explicit regionalism focus of the 
CMI.
6  The CMI‟s ASEAN+3 membership recalled the EAEC proposal, and was in stark 
contrast to the pan-Pacific composition of APEC.  The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) which 
began to hold biennial summits in 1996 may also have contributed to a sense of Asian-only 
regionalism encapsulated in ASEAN+3, although the EU was more concerned about its own 
exclusion from groups like APEC than in promoting Asian solidarity.
7 
In the financial sphere The Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) was launched at the 
EMEAP central banks forum and endorsed by ASEAN+3 finance ministers in 2003.  The 
ABMI is intended to mobilise the region‟s currency reserves for the region‟s own needs, but 
the value of bonds issued remains small.  The first Asian Bond Fund pooled one billion US 
dollars from the eleven EMEAP members for investment in US-dollar denominated bonds 
issued by sovereign or quasi-sovereign borrowers from eight of the EMEAP economies.  In 
June 2005 the second Asian Bond Fund invested $2 billion in local currency denominated 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds from the same eight economies.  The ABMI‟s main role 
has  been  to  highlight  both  cross-border  and  domestic  market  impediments  (e.g.  capital 
controls and variations in withholding and other taxes) to bond market development in the 
region. 
At the same time a new wave of RTAs centred on bilateral agreements and focussing 
on non-tariff barriers to trade originated in East Asia (and was taken up energetically by the 
Bush Administration in the USA).  In the final months of 2000 the leaders of China and Japan 
individually  approached  ASEAN  with  proposals  for  a  free  trade  agreement,  and  in  the 
following year China, Japan and Korea discussed a coordinated ASEAN+3 FTA.
8  However, 
China became impatient with the slow progress and negotiated a bilateral FTA with ASEAN 
in 2002.
9  Apart from this major ASEAN+1 agreement, dozens of bilateral trade agreements 
were concluded by East Asian countries. 
 
                                                           
6 The Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks was established in 1991 and currently has eleven 
members (the original ASEAN5, Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). 
7 The ASEM summits in Bangkok (1996), London (1998) and Seoul (2000) were attended by leaders of the 
fifteen EU countries, seven ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea. 
8 Lee, Koo and Park (2008) describe the dramatic change in the three countries' positions on trade agreements.  
Using a gravity model, they conclude that the Three have not been adversely affected by the existence of major 
regional RTAs, which implies that the post-2000 increase in RTAs in East Asia is internally driven rather than a 
defensive response to developments elsewhere.  
9 China turned to bilateral trade agreements after completing its WTO accession negotiations.  China had an 
advantage over Japan and Korea insofar as its FTA with ASEAN could obtain a WTO waiver of most-favoured 
nation  treatment  under  the  Enabling  Clause  which  governs  preferential  arrangements  among  developing 
countries, whereas any Japanese or Korean FTAs have to gain waivers under the stricter conditions of Article 
XXIV. 6 
 
(a) Money before Trade: Is there an Asian Sequence? 
 
Bela  Balassa  (1961)  set  out  a  five-stage  taxonomy  of  economic  integration  from  simple 
preferential tariffs to a free trade area (preferential tariffs equal zero) to a customs union 
(FTA plus common external trade policy) to a common market (customs union plus free 
movement of capital and labour) to economic union.  Although Balassa viewed this as a 
taxonomy  from  shallow  to  deeper  economic  integration,  his  stages  have  often  been 
interpreted as a chronological sequence, capturing Western European regional integration, 
which broadly followed a trade-first sequence.  The customs union established in the 1960s 
was followed by reductions in the restrictions to labour and capital movement, and finally by 
monetary union at least among some European Union members. 
The slow progress on intra-Asian trade liberalization combined with the establishment 
of the CMI encouraged some observers to identify a distinctive Asian sequence of monetary 
integration  preceding  trade  integration.    There  is  some  logic  to  the  idea  that  monetary 
integration  will  facilitate  intra-regional  trade  (Dieter  and  Higgott,  2003).    However,  the 
empirical support for the Asian sequence remains slight (Pomfret, 2005).  The CMI played a 
minimal role in the 2008-9 global crisis because Asian countries' own reserves were more 
than adequate, i.e. governments had learned national rather than regional lessons from the 
1997-8 Asian crisis.  Both the CMI and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) are minor 
contributions to Asian monetary integration, even with the vaunted Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM) in early 2009.
10 
More substantive steps, such as the proposal for an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), 
have  made  no  progress,  and  an  Asian  Monetary  Fund  (AMF)  or  Asian  currency  remain 
distant.
11  The key obstacle is lack of political will.  There is disagreement about which 
currencies  should  be  included  in  an  AMU  and  with  what  weights.    There  would  be 
disagreement about relative voting weights in an AMF, and about who should run monetary 
policy in a currency union.  With the multilateralization of the CMI in early 2009 came 
agreement on contributions and voting rights, by which equal weights for Japan and China 
                                                           
10 The ASEAN+3 finance ministers decided to multilateralize the CMI swap arrangements, so that a country 
with balance-of-payments problems can access the entire pool, which the ministers agreed should amount to a 
total of US$120 billion.  However, issues such as economic surveillance before release of CMIM funds and 
monitoring to ensure due diligence after disbursement remain unresolved.  
11 Dieter (2007, 139) similarly concludes that “monetary regionalism in Asia will both be a complex endeavour 
and will – if at all - only be achieved in the long run.”  Grimes (2009) takes a slightly more upbeat position on 
the  process,  but  from  an  international  relations  perspective  of  how  the  CMI,  ABMI  etc  affect  interaction 
between  Japan,  China  and  the  USA  rather  than  from  a  perspective  of  enhanced  regional  financial  market 
integration or monetary coordination. 7 
 
were achieved by a fudge: the share of China plus Hong Kong is equal to that of Japan, 
although Hong Kong is in many respects a separate economic entity and was not party to the 
CMI.
12  Even beyond the tensions between the established and rising economic power for 
supremacy, it is uncertain what the weight should be of the mid-rank economic powers, led 
by Korea but also including the larger ASEAN economies. 
In the twenty-first century, East Asian regional agreements have primarily concerned 
trade.   The spread of trade agreements  in  Asia has  been documented  by  Menon (2007), 
Kawai and Wignaraja (2007), Lee et al. (2009) and ADB (2008).  However, it is difficult to 
generalize  about  the  agreements‟ content.    Many  of  the  agreements  lack  much  serious 
content,  and  address  specific,  sometimes  apparently  minor,  issues  (Pomfret,  2007).  The 
agreements are not primarily about tariff barriers, but more often about reducing border and 
behind-the-border trade costs. 
Reflecting the accelerated pace of regional integration, an initiative to establish an 
ASEAN Economic Community was launched at the 2003 ASEAN summit in Bali, and at the 
January 2007 summit the target date for creation of a single ASEAN market was brought 
forward to 2015.  The ASEAN Economic Community project is an attempt to unify and 
extend  the  ASEAN  Free  Trade  Area,  the  ASEAN  Investment  Area  and  the  ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services, and is clearly aimed at facilitating trade. 
At the same time as ASEAN was deepening its own regional integration, it looked for 
new institutional arrangements with its northeast Asian trading partners.  ASEAN had been 
considering in 2000 a proposal for integration among ASEAN+3, but foot-dragging by Japan 
and Korea (Munakata 2006: 117-8) led to ASEAN and China moving swiftly in 2001 towards 
negotiating a trade agreement.  In November 2002 ASEAN and China signed the framework 
agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which foreshadowed establishment of 
an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area within ten years.  In June 2003 China and Thailand signed 
an “early harvest” agreement to eliminate tariffs on 108 edible vegetables and 80 edible fruits 
and nuts from 1 October 2003, and early harvest measures involving other ASEAN members 
were introduced on 1 January 2004.  In November 2004 the formal Agreement on Trade in 
Goods between ASEAN and China was signed; it envisaged establishment of a free-trade 
                                                           
12 Japan will contribute $38.4 billion, or 32% of the $120 billion total, while China will contribute $34.2 billion 
and Hong Kong $4.2 billion.  Thus Japan is the largest single contributor and China and Hong Kong are the 
biggest  co-equal  contributors.   These  shares  contrast  to  earlier  arrangements  such  as  funding  of  the  Asian 
Development Bank, in which China‟s share is less than half of Japan‟s.  Korea‟s contribution to the CMIM is 
$24 billion and other contributions less than $5 billion per country.  As a reference point, Korea's bilateral swap 
agreement with the US Federal Reserve is for up to $30 billion; Japan's liquidity swap agreement with the US 
Fed is unlimited. 8 
 
area by 2010 for six ASEAN members and by 2015 for the four newest ASEAN members.  In 
addition,  the  framework  agreement  foresaw  more  comprehensive  liberalization,  with 
agriculture,  human  resource  development,  information  and  communication  technology, 
investment, and development of the Mekong River Basin identified as priority areas (Sen, 
2004, 76) and collaboration on illegal immigration, drug smuggling, counterterrorism and 
other security concerns also on the agenda (Kwei, 2006, 121). 
In sum, despite the stimulus of regional dissatisfaction with international monetary 
institutions during the 1997-8 Asian Crisis and the CMI, regionalism in East Asia has been 
primarily in trade.  This is consistent with the observation by Estevadeordal and Suominen 
(2008, 129-30) based on analysis of cooperation agreements at the global level that “states 
cooperate disproportionately more in the domain of trade than in other domains. This may 
suggest that trade has properties that render it particularly amenable to formal as well as 
bilateral cooperation”.  The distinctive feature of Asian agreements is not a novel sequencing, 
but the focus on trade facilitation rather than preferential trade policies 
 
(b) Variable Geometry: Who belongs in the Asian Region? 
 
Intertwined with the struggle for regional hegemony is the question of how the region should 
be defined.  ASEAN expanded in the second half of the 1990s to include Laos, Myanmar, 
Vietnam and Cambodia.  ASEAN+3 emerged as a broader grouping in the late 1990s, but by 
the turn of the century Japan was becoming concerned about China‟s weight in this grouping 
and neighbouring countries were concerned about being excluded.   
At the eighth ASEAN+3 summit in 2004, it was agreed to convene a regular East Asia 
Summit (EAS).  The First East Asia Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005, 
was preceded by arguments about whom to invite, with China favouring a guest list limited to 
ASEAN+3.
  Japan argued successfully for Australia, India and New Zealand to be included, 
so that the East Asia Summit configuration is sometimes referred to as ASEAN+6.  At the 
summit China argued for Russia‟s inclusion, but no agreement was reached and the second 
East Asia Summit held in Cebu in January 2007 had the same participants as the first.
13  
There  was  also  no  clarification  of  the  relative  roles  of  the  East  Asia  summits  and  the 
ASEAN+3 summits in the evolving regional architecture. 
                                                           
13 Russia participated in the first EAS as an observer at the invitation of 2005 host Malaysia and its request to 
become a future member seems to be supported by China and India, but no formal progress has been made. 
Timor-Leste is seeking ASEAN membership and became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 
2005; presumably any new member of ASEAN would also join the EAS. 9 
 
It is not essential that all functions of regional institutions be met by organizations 
with a common membership, and Australia in particular has pushed for “variable geometry” 
as a practical way forward.  However, if there is a core membership, there will inevitably be 
competition  to  be  included  in  the  core  and  for  pre-eminence  within  the  core.    One 
consequence  of  the  East  Asia  Summit  was  to  highlight  the  competition  for  regional 
leadership.
  Even though China gave way to Japan on the invitation list, the summit was a 
Chinese  initiative  and  Japan  felt  a  need  to  respond.    The  Japanese  proposal  of  a 
Comprehensive  Economic  Partnership  in  East  Asia  among  the  16  East  Asia  Summit 
participants was controversial, especially because it seems even more than the EAEC to be an 
RTA that excludes the USA.
   The various forums reflect Great Power competition, with 
Japan using the broader East Asia Summit membership to counterbalance China‟s success 
with  a more functional  approach towards relations with  ASEAN  and in various bilateral 
agreements.
 14 
The East Asia Summit (EAS) provided an alternative grouping of ASEAN+3 plus 
Australia,  India  and  New  Zealand.
15  FTAs  between  ASEAN  and  the  Closer  Economic 
Relations  (CER)  countries  (Australia  and  New  Zealand)  and  ASEAN  and  India  also 
highlighted  the  broader  region.    However,  the  EAS  raises  questions  about  the  trade  off 
between size and efficacy (is 16 countries too many to reach agreements?) and about the 
position of geographically cognate countries not in these arrangements, such as Bangladesh 
or Papua New Guinea. 
The phenomenon of non-members wanting to be in the club (“the grass always looks 
greener beyond the fence”) is illustrated by the expansion of EU membership and also by the 
recent flourishing of G? Groups.   The G7 meetings, which began in 1975 in response to the 
economic shocks of the early and mid-1970s, brought together the leaders of the seven largest 
market economies in annual summits.  In 1997 Russia was invited to join what became the 
G8.  By the twenty-first century with the economic rise of China, India and Brazil, the G8 
seemed anachronistic.  The problem was addressed in 2009 by convening a G20 meeting 
                                                           
14 India is a latecomer to the competition. As well as participating in the East Asia Summits, India promotes the 
Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), a preferential trading arrangement open to all members of the UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). APTA‟s current members are Bangladesh, 
China, India, South Korea and Sri Lanka. So far APTA has had little impact on regional trade flows. 
15 Australia and New Zealand embraced deep regionalism with their 1983 CER agreement.  Several overtures to 
link the CER and ASEAN were rebuffed in the 1990s and early 2000s.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s 
Australia played a leadership role in arrangements such as APEC or EMEAP, but under the 1996-2007 Liberal 
governments  engaged  less  actively  with  Asia  at  the  political  level,  even  as  economic  ties  continued  to 
strengthen.   In 2006 Australia‟s government publicly stated that “if invited by ASEAN+3 members, Australia 
would be willing to make a financial and practical contribution to the Chiang Mai Initiative” (Corbett and 
Fitriani, 2008), but no invitation came and the CMIM remained an ASEAN+3 affair. 10 
 
which include not only the G8 countries but also the major Latin American economies, South 
Africa, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India and Australia.  From East Asia the G20 included Japan, 
China, Korea and Indonesia.  ASEAN was represented by Thailand which held the rotating 
presidency.    However,  in  future  Thailand  will  not  be  represented  and  could  legitimately 
question why Indonesia has a seat and it does not when their GDP is roughly equal.  Mid-
sized economic powers  such as  Australia  and  Korea  are  vigorous  supporters  of the  G20 
grouping, because it represents a number which will just include them; with more exclusive 
membership  Australia  and  Korea  would  likely  be  excluded  and  in  a  bigger  group  each 
country‟s weight would be smaller.
16  Similar tensions surround the composition of the UN 
Security  Council,  where  the  five  permanent  members  are  jealous  of  their  position  while 
countries such as Japan, India, Germany or Brazil consider their claim to be at least equal to 
that  of  an  existing  member.    In  Asia  this  plays  out  in  competition  between  regional 
organizations.  China has greater influence within the UN Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).  Japan has more influence, because it provides the largest 
share of funding, in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
In sum, the geographical extent of Asian regionalism remains in a fluid state.  The 
core in recent years has been ASEAN.   In the twenty-first century ASEAN‟s institutional 
relations with China have strengthened, and much of the action has centred on the reaction of 
Japan  to  the  challenge  of  China‟s  growing  economic  significance  and  concerns  of  other 
countries such as Korea or in a wider circle Australia and India about their role in regional 
institutional  developments.  Such  concerns  are  counter-productive  for  cooperation  and 
regional integration because power and influence are zero-sum games.  They may be even 
more corrosive in Asia because, in the absence of clear geographical borders defined by 
mountains or water, the geometry of Asian regionalism is variable.
17  The arena for fighting 
over influence itself becomes a source of endless manoeuvring with little net benefit. 
                                                           
16 Korea and Australia both favour the idea that the Asian G6 from the G20 countries should play a strategic 
agenda-setting role on Asian regional issues.  Australian Prime Minister Rudd‟s proposals along these lines in 
Singapore (speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit on 29 May 2009) would not have been popular with his 
hosts who have seen Singapore as a hub for ASEAN and East Asian regionalization.  Korea is devoting much 
energy to hosting the G20 finance ministers` meeting in 2010 and, as G20 chair for the year, is responsible for 
preparing for the 2010 summit. 
17  To  the  north  and  west,  Central  Asia  and  Mongolia  are  geographically  and  culturally  closely  linked  to 
neighbouring provinces of China, and organizations such as Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization bridge these countries.  To the south  west, India and 
Pakistan are linked  by  history and institutionally  in the South  Asian  Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), while Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran are members 
of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).  To the southeast Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste are 
contiguous with Indonesia and the three countries are neighbours of Australia, while including New Zealand in 11 
 
 
3.  Driving Forces behind Asian Regionalism 
 
Until the 1990s the trade of Asian countries was largely with countries outside the region.  
Japan initiated a trend towards integrated production chains within East Asia when it invested 
heavily in Southeast Asia after the yen‟s post-1985 appreciation.  Intraregional trade and 
investment in East Asia began to increase rapidly during the 1990s, and by 1996 intraregional 
trade accounted for 50% of the East Asian countries‟ total trade, compared to about a third at 
the start of the 1980s.
18 
As Asian incomes and demand rose, regional markets became more important.
19  At 
the same time regional value chains began to emerge, a pattern documented in the “Emerging 
Asian Regionalism” project (ADB, 2008).
 20    Regional networks became denser in the 1990s 
and China played an increasingly central role.
21  Intra-industry trade (IIT) increased rapidly; 
Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007), Haddad (2007) and Gruenwald and Hori (2008) 
provide evidence that Asian IIT is vertical intra-industry trade associated with fragmentation 
of production rather than the horizontal intra-industry trade due to product differentiation 
observed in Europe.
22  Input-output analysis of the destination of Asian exports of final goods 
reinforces the conclusion that the region still relies on markets beyond the region.
23 
The emergence and rapid growth of regional value chains created pressures for trade 
facilitation because fragmentation of the production process is only profitable if the cost of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
this group provides a link across Polynesia.  This last link suggests that the Pacific Ocean itself may be a bridge, 
which is reflected in the concept and composition of APEC. 
18 The share of intraregional trade in total exports dipped after the Asian Crisis, but climbed back to 52% in 
2004, when the import share was 57% (Munakata, 2006, 47).  These are higher than equivalent measures for 
NAFTA and similar to those for the EU in the mid-1980s.  Trade intensity indices also show increasing trade 
within the East Asia region during the 1990s (Sohn, 2002; Ng and Yeats, 2003).  This section draws on material 
analysed in greater depth in Pomfret (forthcoming). 
19 The increased regionalization of the East Asian economy is described in Frankel and Kahler (1993), Hatch 
and Yamamura (1996), Aggarwal and Morrison (1998, 65-86), Lincoln (2004, 42-113), Munakata (2006, 37-
61), Rajan (2006) and Dean and Lovely (2008). 
20 Ando and Kimura (2005) calculate very high shares of machinery (HS84-92) in East Asian countries‟ trade in 
1996 and 2000, and conclude that  this structure is especially  suited to production  fragmentation.  Pomfret 
(forthcoming) discusses the emergence of regional value chains in East Asia in greater depth. 
21  Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci (2006) and Athukorala (2007) emphasize China‟s growing role in this 
process. 
22 Fragmentation is analysed in Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001).  Xing (2007) calculates intra-industry trade, IIT 
(measured at the 3-digit SITC level), to have accounted for 6% of China‟s bilateral trade with Japan in 1980, 
18% in 1992 and 34% in 2004 and finds that Japanese foreign direct investment performed a significant role in 
enhancing IIT.  Zhang et al. (2005) have comparable estimates. 
23 Pula and Peltonen (2009) estimate that only 7% of emerging Asia‟s GDP was ultimately sold as exports to 
another emerging Asia country, while 22% went to the USA, EU and Japan.  Exposure to external markets was 
highlighted in 2008 when East Asia experienced little financial contagion from the crisis in the USA, UK and 
elsewhere, but suffered from reduced import demand in the crisis economies. 12 
 
moving components across borders is low in terms of both money and time.  In the pre-1990 
setting there was no pressure for preferential tariff reductions within an RTA, because East 
Asian  countries  were  not  selling  within  the  region,  and  indeed  the  import-competing 
industries opposed reduction in their protection whether the liberalization was preferential or 
multilateral.  With production fragmentation and the emergence of regional value chains, the 
pressures were for trade facilitation.
24  Small tariffs were irrelevant; what mattered was the 
absence of delays and unexpected costs when crossing borders. 
These  pressures  were in the  1990s  addressed  predominantly  by national measures 
such as improved customs administration.   Sometimes there was bilateral cooperation as 
between Singapore and Johor (Malaysia) and between Singapore and Riau (Indonesia) to 
facilitate trade within the Sijori subregional zone.  ASEAN provided a forum for setting 
regional standards for integrated border management.  Although trade facilitation consisted of 
many discrete measures of unknown individual impact, there is strong evidence that during 
the 1990s trade costs within ASEAN fell faster than in other parts of the world (Pomfret and 
Sourdin, 2009; Shepherd and Wilson, 2008).  Measures to promote supply chain integration 
in specific sectors such as information and communications technology and the deepening of 
ASEAN integration towards formation of an Asean Economic Community by 2015 continues 
this pattern in the twenty-first century.
25 
  Similarly, the ASEAN-China FTA was a response to the increasingly central role 
played by China in regional value chains that involved a subset of ASEAN countries. The 
accelerated pace and broad scope of China-ASEAN negotiations in the early years of the 
twenty-first  century  reflected  the  growth  of  regional  value  chains  involving  China  and 
Southeast Asian nations and the corresponding need to reduce trade costs.   The bilateral and 
plurilateral  trade  agreements  are  hard  to  classify,  but  preferential  tariff  rates  are  not  the 
centrepiece and the terms are more commonly aimed at addressing specific concerns about 
trade costs.
  The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand (AANZFTA) signed in February 2009, for 
                                                           
24 Baldwin (2006) sees the recent Asian trade agreements posing a threat to intra-regional trade.  He diagnoses 
Asian  regionalism  as  suffering  from  the  “Noodle  Bowl  Syndrome”  and  argues  that  these  complex  and 
undisciplined trade agreements will disrupt “the smooth functioning of „Factory Asia‟ ... [which is dependent 
on]  .  .  the  free  flow  of  intra-regional  trade”.    This  argument  fails  to  explain  why  the  agreements  have 
proliferated since the late 1990s.  Baldwin ascribes the proliferation to a “big-hearted gesture” from China to 
assuage ASEAN fears of Chinese competition and the domino effect that followed the China-ASEAN FTA, but 
China  (like  most  economic  powers)  is  not  noted  for  big-heartedness  and  freeing  up  bilateral  trade  would 
exacerbate any fears that ASEAN countries might have harboured. 
25 In many key sectors tariffs are not an issue.  Much of the shipping of electronics components that dominates, 
for example, Korea-China trade is covered by the multilateral Information Technology Products Agreement 
signed at the 1996 WTO Ministerial in Singapore.  Moreover, import of intermediates is frequently exempt from 
duties as long as the product is eventually exported. 13 
 
example,  has  a  very  short  chapter  on  tariffs,  and  country-specific  schedules  for  tariff 
reductions, while the other twelve chapters concern measures to improve the environment in 
which trade occurs, with improved customs procedures, smoother quarantine processes, more 
transparent rules  and regulations, the alignment of standards  and so  forth.   The bilateral 
agreements are often scoffed for failure to reduce tariffs and for claiming to be WTO-Plus, 
but the latter label is accurate insofar as the agreements address trade facilitation measures 
which have not been part of past rounds of WTO multilateral trade negotiations, and are only 
weakly represented on the Doha agenda. 
 
4.  Future Prospects 
 
In sum, there has been considerable activity aimed at reducing trade costs in East Asia.  Some 
of this is in a broad Asia-Pacific context, but most determinedly it has centred on ASEAN 
since the mid-1990s and subsequently included China, and to a lesser extent Japan and Korea.  
This  has  coincided  with  increased  regionalization  of  East  Asian  trade  and  the  growing 
importance of regional value chains.  The needs of participants in these value chains have 
driven unilateral, bilateral and regional moves to reduce trade costs. 
When  regionalism  finally  arrived  in  East  Asia  it  centred  on  trade,  but  on  trade 
facilitation rather than traditional trade policies.  In this sense it is deep integration because it 
addresses issues of domestic administration and regulation that are beyond the scope of the 
first four stages of Balassa‟s taxonomy, but it is unlikely to encompass meaningful monetary 
integration in the near future.  The width of Asian regionalism is likely to be determined by 
the geographical range of the regional value chains. 
Finally,  a  distinctive  feature  of  the  new  regionalism  in  Asia  is  its  openness  and 
essentially  non-discriminatory  nature.    For  example,  although  trade  facilitation  measures 
within ASEAN are agreed at a  regional level  or among  a subset  of members, improved 
documentation, port logistics and so forth reduce costs of trade with all partners; a Thai-
Malaysian bilateral agreement to reduce border costs, e.g. by simplifying customs forms or 
having a one-stop process, is likely to benefit all traders crossing the Malaysian or Thai 
border.  Thus the current wave of East Asian regionalism with its plethora of bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements is not creating an EU or NAFTA style of RTA with clear-cut external 
borders, but a less well-defined area of trader-friendly conditions centred on ASEAN and 
China but with malleable outer limits. 
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